and its capacity to continue its war
Russia’s capacity to continue its war against Ukraine is a paradox: it remains capable of sustaining the conflict in the short-to-medium term, yet faces accumulating structural constraints that increasingly limit its long-term prospects. Information approved by the regime is little, and limited. A proper evaluation from outside of Russia would then require looking at what can be surmised regarding military attrition, manpower, industrial capacity, economic resilience, and societal stability.
1. Military losses and remaining combat capacity
Scale of personnel losses
Estimates vary, but most credible analyses agree that Russian losses have been extremely high:
- Western and independent estimates suggest hundreds of thousands of casualties, with some projections exceeding 1 million killed or injured by 2025
- Ukrainian-based tallies claim over 1.3 million cumulative personnel losses by early 2026 (including killed, wounded, and missing)
Even allowing for exaggeration in wartime reporting, the attritional scale is undeniable. This has several implications:
- Loss of experienced officers and NCOs (harder to replace than conscripts)
- Declining unit cohesion and tactical effectiveness
- Increasing reliance on poorly trained recruits
Equipment attrition
Material losses are also immense:
- Thousands of tanks destroyed (estimates range from ~4,400 to far higher depending on methodology)
- Since 2024 alone: ~1,865 tanks, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, and large numbers of artillery systems lost
- Aircraft, helicopters, naval assets, and missiles also significantly degraded
Key dynamic: Russia compensates losses not by modernization but by drawing on Soviet-era stockpiles, often requiring costly refurbishment . This keeps the war going but reduces overall quality.
Operational effectiveness
Despite large forces, Russian advances remain extremely slow:
- Advances measured in tens of meters per day in some sectors
- Territorial gains of less than 1% of Ukraine annually
This suggests high cost for marginal gains, characteristic of a grinding war of attrition.
2. Recruitment challenges and manpower sustainability
Russia has avoided full national mobilization, relying instead on:
- Contract soldiers (financial incentives)
- Regional recruitment drives
- Prison recruitment (earlier in the war)
However, structural problems are growing:
- Demographic decline limits the pool of young men
- War fatigue reduces voluntary enlistment
- Increasing reliance on financial incentives raises fiscal costs
While Russia can still replenish manpower, it increasingly does so at the expense of quality, training time, and morale.
3. Military-industrial constraints
Sanctions and technology bottlenecks
Western sanctions have severely restricted access to:
- Advanced semiconductors
- Precision manufacturing equipment
- Aviation components
As a result:
- Russia struggles to produce modern weapons systems
- It relies on simplified or downgraded substitutes
- Innovation has largely stalled
Aircraft and repair issues
Sanctions have particularly affected aviation:
- Limited access to spare parts for civilian and military aircraft
- Cannibalization of existing planes for parts
- Reduced long-term readiness of air fleets
Strategic implication
Russia can still produce large quantities of basic equipment, but:
- Quality is declining
- Maintenance cycles are lengthening
- Long-term sustainability is weakening
4. Economic resilience vs. structural strain
GDP, growth, and inflation
Russia’s economy has not collapsed—but it has slowed sharply:
- Growth fell to around 0.6% in 2025
- Budget deficit increased (e.g., 2.6% of GDP in 2025)
- Inflation, high interest rates, and tax increases are rising
War economy dynamics
Russia has transitioned into a war-driven economic model:
- Military spending exceeds 6–7% of GDP
- Up to 40% of public spending directed to defense
This sustains the war effort but:
- Crowds out civilian sectors (healthcare, education)
- Reduces long-term productivity
- Increases dependence on state intervention
Oil and gas sector damage
Energy—the backbone of Russia’s economy—has been hit:
- Estimated $180 billion in lost oil/gas revenue since 2022
- Discounted exports and longer shipping routes reduce profits
- Infrastructure increasingly targeted by Ukrainian strikes
5. Trade, sanctions, and investment decline
Sanctions have reshaped Russia’s external economic relations:
- Loss of Western markets and capital
- Reduced foreign direct investment
- Dependence on alternative partners (e.g., China, India) at less favorable terms
Key consequences:
- Lower technological transfer
- Reduced productivity growth
- Long-term stagnation risk
Russia has partially adapted, but adaptation often means lower efficiency and higher costs.
6. Social pressures: inflation, poverty, and repression
Living standards
Economic strain is increasingly visible:
- Rising prices and taxes
- Wage stagnation in civilian sectors
- Growing regional inequality
Small businesses are particularly affected by:
- Reduced demand
- Higher borrowing costs
- Regulatory pressure
Political stability
The regime has so far maintained control through:
- Media censorship
- Repression of dissent
- Nationalist messaging
However, risks are accumulating:
- Fear of mobilization
- Discontent among families of soldiers
- Potential for localized protests
7. Information control and societal support
Russia has imposed:
- Internet restrictions
- Media censorship
- Criminal penalties for dissent
These measures:
- Limit visible opposition
- Prevent large-scale coordinated activism
However, they also:
- Reduce business innovation (especially tech sectors)
- Encourage emigration
- Undermine long-term legitimacy
8. Brain drain and loss of human capital
One of the most significant long-term costs has been emigration of skilled workers:
- IT professionals, engineers, and entrepreneurs have left in large numbers
- Labor shortages are now reported across sectors
Effects:
- Reduced technological capacity
- Lower innovation potential
- Greater dependence on foreign technology (often restricted)
9. Cultural and sports isolation
International restrictions on Russian participation in:
- Sports competitions
- Cultural events
- Academic collaboration
have symbolic and psychological effects:
National pride
- Reduced global visibility and prestige
- Loss of soft power
Domestic perception
- Reinforces a sense of isolation
- Can both:
- Strengthen nationalist narratives (“Russia vs. the West”)
- Undermine confidence among globally connected elites
Elite dissatisfaction
- Athletes, artists, and professionals face curtailed careers
- Urban middle classes—traditionally more internationally integrated—are disproportionately affected
10. Overall assessment: sustainability vs. decline
Short-term (1–2 years)
Russia likely can continue the war because:
- It still has large manpower reserves
- Soviet-era stockpiles cushion equipment losses
- The state can redirect economic resources toward war
Medium-term (3–5 years)
Constraints intensify:
- Economic stagnation and fiscal strain
- Declining equipment quality
- Growing labor shortages
- Reduced technological capacity
Long-term outlook
The key issue is not collapse but gradual degradation:
- Military: shifting from modern to increasingly outdated systems
- Economy: from growth to stagnation or recession
- Society: from passive support to latent dissatisfaction
Conclusion
Russia retains the capacity to sustain its war effort, but increasingly through inefficient, costly, and unsustainable means. The war has become a system of attritional endurance, where:
- Military strength is maintained by quantity over quality
- Economic stability is preserved through state control rather than growth
- Social cohesion is enforced through repression rather than consent
International sanctions, technological isolation, and human capital loss are not causing immediate collapse—but they are eroding the foundations of long-term power. The result is a state that can continue fighting, yet at the cost of progressively weakening itself in nearly every structural dimension.
— Adam Donaldson Powell
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